Our research -building on experimental results of Cason and Mui (2007) -examines why a subordinate in a leader-subordinate relationship is willing to pay a cost to help prevent exploitation of another subordinate by the leader. Using a stylized game capturing essential features of the leader-subordinate relationship, Cason and Mui find that when the leader attempts to "divideand-conquer" the subordinates, the subordinate not targeted for exploitation will still choose to challenge the leader's exploitation a significant fraction of the time, even though challenging is costly and there is no direct material benefit. As a result, subordinates achieve coordinated joint resistance more than equilibrium analysis would predict. While Cason and Mui suggest that coordinated resistance is due to a fairness norm -the non-targeted subordinate shows solidarity with the targeted subordinate -another motive may be at play: an incentive to gain a reputation for challenging. Each subordinate has an equal chance of being the victim of future leader exploitation.
challenge the leader's exploitation a significant fraction of the time, even though challenging is costly and there is no direct material benefit. As a result, subordinates achieve coordinated joint resistance more than equilibrium analysis would predict. While Cason and Mui suggest that coordinated resistance is due to a fairness norm -the non-targeted subordinate shows solidarity with the targeted subordinate -another motive may be at play: an incentive to gain a reputation for challenging. Each subordinate has an equal chance of being the victim of future leader exploitation.
As a result, there is an incentive to create an expectation among leaders that "divide-and-conquer" style exploitation will be met with coordinated resistance: each subordinate secures a higher payoff on average if the leader chooses not to transgress. Furthermore, a subordinate has an incentive to challenge now if they think it will increase the likelihood that joint resistance will be successful in the future. Our experimental design systematically removes the incentive to reputation build.
It is designed to test whether the willingness of subordinates to help resist exploitation of fellow subordinates is motivated by a solidarity preference specific to hierarchical relationships or as an attempt to influence the behavior of the leader -and other subordinates -in the future. We find that the role of solidarity among subordinates best explains the data.
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Introduction
What motivates agents to resist when a leader attempts to gain or maintain influence via a divideand-conquer strategy? Examples of leaders breaking up larger groups into smaller ones that have less power are prevalent -from the times of Machievelli (Zeitlin and Weyher, 2001) , to Western countries using the strategy in Africa (Croucher, 2004) , to Wal-mart's recent pledge to "go green" (Tasini, 2008) , to management/labor disputes (LeDuff, 2000) . Often the strategy is successful, but it also is often met by coordinated joint resistance -subordinates show solidarity, banding together at a personal cost to thwart the divide-and-conquer strategy. Examples include strikes and unionization (Horowitz, 1997; Zeitlin and Weyher, 2001; Gordon and Lenhardt, 2007; Oyogoa, 2009) . Our research uses experimental methods to examine the extent to which this type of subordinate solidarity is driven by a fairness norm or driven by the desire to build expectations among both leaders and other subordinates that leader transgressions will be successfully resisted. Weingast (1997) introduced a political model representing how exploitative leaders can effectively maintain power in a society where there are different interest groups. It also has natural applications to other situations where one individual has authority over multiple subordinates; for example, a manager and worker relationship. The situation can be modeled by the "divide-and-conquer" (DAC) game.
1
In the DAC game, there are three players: one leader and two subordinates, A and B. The leader has four available actions: (i) transgress against both subordinates, (ii) transgress against neither, (iii) transgress against A, and (iv) transgress against B. These last two actions provide the leader an opportunity to "divide-and-conquer". The subordinates have two available actions: challenge or acquiesce. As long as both subordinates do not challenge, a "divide-and-conquer" strategy gains rewards for the leader at the expense of the targeted subordinate. The beneficiary of the transgression earns a higher payoff by acquiescing than by challenging, regardless of what action the targeted subordinate takes. For a small cost, though, the beneficiary can challenge the leader's transgression, and if the targeted subordinate also challenges they achieve coordinated joint resistance. At this outcome both subordinates earn what they would get if the leader did not transgress minus the small cost 1 Weigast called it the" Sovereign-Constituency Transgression Game". 01.19.2010 of challenging, and the leader earns zero, which is significantly less than if he had chosen transgress against neither. Social surplus is maximized when the leader chooses transgress against neither and both subordinates acquiesce. However, this outcome is not part of any equilibrium. Cason and Mui (2007) examine the DAC game in a laboratory experiment, focusing on when communication does or does not allow subordinates to successfully work together to resist exploitation by a leader. They find that when the leader chooses to transgress against one subordinate, a significant fraction of the subordinates coordinate on joint resistance. This is despite the beneficiary paying a price in their own period payoff to help the targeted subordinate with no direct material benefit. Over time, some leaders adapt their strategy, choosing to transgress against neither. Cason and Mui interpret beneficiaries challenging, and hence coordinated joint resistance, as evidence of fairness: some subordinates are "altruistic punishers" (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; DeQuervain et al., 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Gintis et al., 2005) . Subordinates choose to punish the leader -even at a personal cost -for having violated social norms.
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An alternative argument -not invoking an appeal to social preferences -is that subordinates have an individual incentive to create an expectation among leaders that "divide-and-conquer" style transgression will be met with coordinated joint resistance. After all, each subordinate has an equal chance of being the victim of transgression in the future. If there is a greater than 1 4 probability of joint resistance, risk-neutral leaders will not want to transgress. With a low cost of resisting, subordinates may regard investing in a reputation for joint resistance as a worthwhile strategy. If the subordinates can get the leader to choose the transgress against neither option, they can secure a higher payoff than when they face a 50/50 chance of being the victim of the leader's transgression. This suggests a very different motive for joint resistance: a subordinate has a strategic motive to build a reputation as one who challenges in order to alter the leader's or other subordinate's behavior in the future.
We use a novel experimental design to test the extent to which repeated interactions drive some subordinates to resist when they are the current beneficiaries of the leader's divide-and-conquer strategy. We do this by systematically reducing the strategic incentive to resist. The first treatment has leaders pre-commit to their behavior in all periods. Such leader commitment removes the ability for subordinates to influence the leaders' future behavior by their action today. The second treatment goes one step further: leaders pre-commit to their behavior in all periods, as in the first treatment, 2 Evidence that individuals possess a taste for punishment has been provided across a variety of experimental games, including public goods Gächter, 2000, 2002) , investment games (DeQuervain et al., 2004; Rigdon, 2009) , and ultimatum games (Güth et al., 1985; Forsythe et al., 1994; Xiao and Houser, 2005 and one subordinate also pre-commits to their behavior in all periods. Such subordinate commitment removes the ability of subordinates to alter behavior of the leader or the behavior of the subordinate with whom they interact. Each of these treatments leave fairness considerations intact. We can then compare the rates of beneficiary challenge and coordinated joint resistance across the treatments. By comparing these treatments with a baseline treatment where both motivations may be at work, we aim to disentangle the effects of other-regarding motives from those of reputation-building and coordination incentives.
The next section describes the features of the DAC game and experimental findings to date. Section 3 details the experimental design and outlines the empirical hypotheses. Section 4 describes the procedures in the experiment and Section 5 discusses the results. The final section concludes.
The Divide-and-Conquer Game
Our experimental design uses the version of the leader-subordinate scenario drawn from prior experimental literature Mui, 2007, 2009) There are three pure strategy Nash equilibria in the DAC game: (i) the leader plays Transgress Against Both, and both subordinates play Acquiesce; (ii) the leader plays Transgress Against A and both subordinates play Acquiesce; and (iii) the leader plays Transgress Against B and both subordinates play Acquiesce. Importantly, there is no equilibrium of the game that involves the leader playing Transgress Against Neither, and there is no equilibrium that has the subordinates coordinating on the action Challenge.
Prior Experimental Results
Cason and Mui (2007) 
Why Do Beneficiaries Challenge Transgression?
One hypothesis for the high rate of beneficiaries challenging is that some subordinates have a preference for fairness. The care about the outcomes of the other players, and hence are willing to challenge when they are a beneficiary because they prefer the outcome in that case (lower payoff for leader, higher payoff for victim, slightly lower payoff for themselves) to the outcome when they acquiesce (higher payoff for leader, lower payoff for victim, slightly higher payoff for themselves). Hence, they are willing to pay an economic cost to challenge the leader's transgression against the victim. Such subordinates have a social preference reflecting solidarity with other subordinates, and are willing to punish a leader viewed as violating a social norm when he attempts to divide-and-conquer. Altruistic punishment is defined by Fehr and Gächter (2002) as a non-selfish act of punishment which "provide[s] a material benefit for the future interaction partners of the punished subject but not for the punisher." Altruistic punishment can aid in the maintenance of norms and is secured through an enforcement strategies of interpersonal sanctioning.
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This paper introduces another hypothesis: the high rate of beneficiaries challenging -and high rate of coordinated joint resistance -is due to strategic decision-making by the subordinates. There are at least two strategic reasons for a beneficiary to challenge transgression. The first reason is vertical in nature, and the hypothesis is that the beneficiary choosing challenge aims to change the expectations of a leader and hence alter his decision to one more beneficial in the future. The second reason is horizontal in nature, and the hypothesis is that the beneficiary choosing challenge aims to change the expectations of the other subordinate and hence alter her behavior in the future. In both cases, there is strategic incentive to create an expectation that transgression will be met with resistance.
This relies on the argument that the observations of anonymous individuals' play can affect beliefs about the distribution of types in the population, and hence change future behavior through updating.
The first reason -vertical in nature -is that if the leader's divide-and-conquer strategy gets met with resistance, then the leader may change his strategy in the future to one where he chooses the Transgress Against Neither option. Under this option, subordinates can secure a higher payoff than when they face a 50/50 chance of being the victim of the leader's transgression. Subordinates receive a certain payoff of 8 units under Transgress Against Neither compared to an expected payoff of 1 2 (9)+ 1 2 (2) = 5.50 units from Transgress Against A or Transgress Against B. The second reason -horizontal in nature -is that by challenging, a subordinate can signal to the other subordinate that resistance can be successful in an effort to alter the other subordinates behavior in the future.
4 Observing a beneficiary challenging is a very strong signal, and can influence another subordinate's strategy from one of acquiescing to one of challenging. If so, then the pair can reach coordinated joint resistance more often in the future and thereby earn higher payoffs. Both kinds of strategic decision-making could be at work in the standard DAC game. As a result, it is unclear the extent to which coordinated resistance is motivated by expectation building and the extent to which it is motivated by social preferences of subordinates.
Our experiment systematically removes each of the strategic reasons for a beneficiary to challenge transgression while leaving in tact the motives for solidarity. Each treatment involves some portion of the subjects pre-committing their actions. We explain this in more detail in the next section.
Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The baseline (b) treatment is a replication of the private ex-ante communication treatment implemented by Cason and Mui (2007) . One treatment -Leader Commitment (lc) -has leaders precommit to their behavior in all periods. Such leader commitment removes the ability for subordinates to influence the leaders' future behavior by their action today. The second treatment -Subordinate Commitment (sc) -goes one step further: leaders pre-commit to their behavior in all periods as in lc and one subordinate also pre-commits to their behavior in all periods. Subordinate commitment removes the ability of the freely choosing subordinate to alter behavior of the leader and the ability to alter the behavior of the subordinate with whom they interact. Each of these treatments leave fairness considerations intact.
Each experimental session consists of two phases. 5 Phase 1 is identical across all of the treatments -subjects interact in the baseline version of the DAC game for 10 periods and are randomly re-matched at the end of each period. In the baseline version of the DAC game, the leader chooses an action. Prior to learning the leader's decision, subordinates are able to communicate a message indicating their intended action under each of the four possible actions by the leader. The leader cannot observe the messages exchanged between the subordinates, but each subordinate observes the other subordinate's four intended choice messages. The subordinates then learn the leader's decision, and simultaneously choose an action to challenge or acquiesce; the chosen action can be the same or different from the messages sent. The leader and subordinates learn all of the decisions and the respective payoffs.
In b, Phase 2 is identical to Phase 1 except subjects participate in 40 periods in the phase, being randomly re-matched at the end of each period. The choice of this treatment as our baseline is based on two considerations. First, it is Cason and Mui's treatment with the highest level of coordinated resistance by subordinates, and also the highest fraction of leaders who choose the Transgress Against
Neither action in later periods. Since we are interested in comparing the rates of coordinated resistance across treatments, it makes sense to select a baseline with the highest rate. Second, there is a similarity in the decision-making environments for private ex-ante signals and our treatment sc where one subordinate will pre-commit to signals and conditional actions in future periods before any others' actions are observed. In both cases signals are chosen ex-ante, before the leader's action can be observed.
In lc, the baseline treatment is modified to remove the vertical nature of the strategic incentives from repeated play. This is accomplished by having the leaders pre-commit to a strategy for the duration of the experiment. Subjects begin with Phase 1. In Phase 2, leaders choose all their actions for the 40 periods of the phase before any further periods are played. Both subordinates respond each period to the leader's pre-committed strategy. Since the leaders are pre-committed to a course of action regardless of subordinates' choices, this removes the incentive subordinates may have to produce a expectation for resistance among the leaders. Consequently, under the hypothesis that subordinates are challenging to influence the leader's behavior in the future, we predict that beneficiary resistance -and hence coordinated resistance -will be lower in lc than in b. Subordinates will perceive no reputation-5 The two phase structure of all of our treatments is slightly different from Cason and Mui, where they have subjects participate in one phase consisting of 50 periods total. We implemented Phase 1 so that subjects would have experience interacting in the DAC game before having to commit to strategies in the future. It is a variation that we do not expect to make a difference. The instructions and protocol are otherwise identical in the baseline.
building motivation if the leaders are already committed to their future course of action, even though they will play further rounds of the game. Therefore, fewer beneficiaries will choose challenge, and this is our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 (Leader Commitment). Beneficiary resistance will be lower in lc than in b.
The lc treatment leaves open the possibility that subordinates' actions will still reflect their repeated interaction with other subordinates; that is, it leaves open the horizontal nature of strategic decision-making. There is still an incentive to coordinate on resistance during any one period where only one subordinate is targeted because the beneficiary of the transgression may find herself targeted by the leader in a future period. In this sense, there is room for subordinates to influence the expectation of other subordinates. To disentangle this expectation building incentive from other-regarding preferences, we conduct an additional treatment. The sc treatment is identical to lc with the additional constraint that half of the subordinates are also pre-committed to a strategy in Phase 2. One subordinate chooses all of her intended actions and actual actions for the remaining periods before observing any actions by the others. The matching is such that each group contains one pre-committed leader, one pre-committed subordinate, and one subordinate who is free to choose her action periodby-period. The "free" subordinate knows that they will never interact with a leader or a subordinate whose behavior is not pre-committed. This removes all strategic incentives for the "free" subordinate, but still leaves open the possibility of beneficiary challenging due to other-regarding preferences. Given that the "free" subordinate interacts with players who have already committed to their future course of action, she will perceive no incentive to change the leader's or the subordinate's expectations as this cannot change either's behavior in the future, even though they will play further rounds of the game. Therefore, we expect that beneficiary resistance will be even lower in this treatment than the others, and this is our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 (Subordinate Commitment). Beneficiary resistance by the "free" subordinates will be lower in sc than by the "free" subordinates in b.
These are our two primary hypotheses. Define R(T ) as the rate of beneficiary resistance under treatment T . Then H 1 and H 2 imply the following predicted ranking:
These rankings arise from the general hypothesis that by systematically removing strategic incentives in repeated play, a subordinate's willingness to engage in beneficiary resistance will be reduced. Since beneficiary resistance is necessary for subordinates to obtain joint resistance, we also hypothesize that rates of joint coordinated resistance will follow the same pattern across treatments.
Procedures
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Robert Zajonc's Laboratory in the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan.
6 We completed a total of 24 independent sessions with 8 sessions for each of the three experimental conditions. The experiment was computerized using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Participants were undergraduates and were recruited using standard experimental procedures. They participated in only one session. Each session required 1.5 to 2.5 hours to complete.
An experimental session ran as follows. Subjects received a $10 show-up payment and were seated in the laboratory. Two sessions were conducted simultaneously with each session having 3 leaders and 6 subordinates. 7 Once all subjects had completed a consent form, the instructions were read aloud. for the instructions). Subjects were informed that there would be a second phase to the experiment as follows: "Phase 2 will be a similar decision-making task, and you will have the same role in it that you have in Phase 1. Further instructions will be provided before Phase 2 begins." 8 Subjects were required to complete a quiz which included payoff calculations for all roles and questions to check their understanding about the interaction; the experimenter checked the quizzes for accuracy.
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Subjects were then randomly assigned a role as either a leader or a subordinate, and they kept this role throughout the session. Subjects were randomly re-matched each period. Subjects first participated 6 We ran the first session in late November 2007 and completed the last session in late April 2009. There were some coding issues that extended the length of time necessary to complete the treatments.
7 Subjects were not aware that the re-groupings only happened among the 9 subjects in their particular session. This is in keeping with Cason and Mui's protocol. 8 This deviates from Cason and Mui's procedures, which had only one phase of 50 total periods. Our aim is to give subjects experience in the DAC game -with decisions counting for monetary payment -prior to selecting pre-committed actions.
9 Subjects were asked true/false questions about the interaction; for example, "You remain grouped with the same two other participants in all decision-making periods" and "If you are Person 2 or Person 3, you must make the same choice on your decision screen as you indicated in the relevant intention screen" and "If you are Person 2 or Person 3, your intentions are shown to all three people in your group (Person 1, Person 2 and Person 3) before anyone makes actual decisions."
in Phase 1, consisting of 10 periods of the baseline version of the DAC game. Then, prior to beginning Phase 2, further instructions were given: in b subjects were informed they would participate in 40 more periods, identical to those in Phase 1 (see Appendix B); in lc the instructions provided additional information that the leader would pre-commit to a strategy for all 40 periods before any more periods were played (see Appendix C); and in sc the instructions provided additional information that in each three-person group, both the leader and one of the subordinates would be pre-committed while the other subordinate would make decisions as in Phase 1 (see Appendix D). Subjects then participated in Phase 2, completing an additional 40 periods of one treatment, being randomly re-matched each period. Participants earned points that were exchanged for dollars at the exchange rate of $0.09/point.
Once the session finished, subjects were paid their accumulated earnings in private. Average earnings (excluding the show-up payment) in b were $29.76 for the leaders and $27.51 for subordinates; in lc earnings were $30.26 for the leaders and $27.01 for subordinates; and in sc earnings were $25.05 for the leaders and $30.36 for subordinates.
Results
In this section, we begin by analyzing the extent to which the baseline data is similar to the private exante treatment conducted by Cason and Mui (2007) . As we demonstrate, the results are statistically indistinguishable. We then turn to analyzing the rates of beneficiary and coordinated resistance, examining behavior under two sets of conditions: (i) when both subordinates signal an intent to challenge and (ii) when the leader chooses a divide-and-conquer strategy, irrespective of the signals sent by the beneficiary and victim. We test our two main hypotheses under each of these sets of conditions. Our focus is on Phase 2 behavior. Recall that Phase 1 is identical across treatments -subjects participate in the baseline version of the DAC for 10 periods. We are interested in differences across treatments so the discussion will center on the results in Phase 2.
10 Periods of Phase 2 are labeled 11-50. We further restrict analysis to periods 21-50 to allow time for subjects to learn -in both treatment conditions, the decision environment has changed significantly from the baseline version of Phase 1. 10 We estimated probit models to check whether or not the rates of leader transgression, beneficiary challenge, and joint resistance were similar in Phase 1 across the experimental conditions. The results provide evidence that behavior was similar across the conditions and therefore, any differential behavior across the conditions cannot be due to differences in experiences in Phase 1.
Replication
The baseline treatment uses instructions and procedures nearly identical to those in Cason and Mui's private ex-ante treatment. We compare the results along a number of important behavioral dimensions, and find that the two are statistically indistinguishable with respect to the following: the rate at which beneficiaries resist when both indicate an intention to challenge (p = 0.7476); the rate of joint resistance when both indicate an intention to challenge (p = 0.4704); the rate at which beneficiaries resist given any signal (p = 0.3728); the rate of joint resistance given any signal (p = 0.1510); and the rate of leader non-transgression (p = 0.56).
11 As a result, we conclude that behavior in the baseline is indistinguishable from that reported by Cason and Mui (2007) . We now turn to discussing differences across treatments and testing our hypotheses.
Resistance Rates When Both Subordinates Indicate Challenge
In this section, we begin by examining our first hypothesis that the rates of beneficiary resistance, and hence coordinated resistance, will be lower in lc than in b. We restrict attention to the case that is the most favorable condition for successful joint resistance to occur: both subordinates have indicated an intention to challenge. Table 1 reports the rates of beneficiary and joint coordinated resistance in Phase 2.
12 Periods 11-20 are data from the first 10 periods, Periods 21-30 are data from the second set of 10 periods, and so on. The bottom two rows report overall rates. The pattern over time is similar across treatments -beneficiary resistance is at its highest point in the first set of periods and gradually declines over time with a resurgence in periods 31-40 following the first decline. The only treatment where the rate is fairly steady is lc. In terms of overall frequency, in b the average is 27.1%.
In lc the average is higher at 44.1%, and is significantly different from b (p = 0.0007). How does this translate into rates of joint resistance? The rate of joint resistance when both indicate challenge is also significantly higher in lc than b -36% versus 24.6% (p = 0.0181).
Result 1. The rate of beneficiary and joint resistance when both subordinates indicate an intention to challenge is significantly higher in lc than in b.
11 Statistical analysis based on a two-tailed t-test; similar results were obtained using ANOVA and Mann-Whitney tests (unless otherwise noted).
12 Estimating a fixed effects regression on the decision of a victim to challenge and on the decision of a beneficiary to challenge, conditional on the messages sent, provides strong evidence that coordinated resistance to a DAC transgression is much more successful when the beneficiary indicates an intention to challenge.
Baseline
Leader This result is in the opposite direction from that stated in H 1 . According to the expectationbuilding hypothesis, once the strategic incentive to influence the leader's actions is removed in lc, the rates of resistance are predicted to be lower. One potential explanation is that with the vertical strategic incentive being removed, the horizontal strategic incentive becomes more important to the subordinates' behavior. Once subordinates no longer have an opportunity to influence and change the leader's behavior to the Transgress Against Neither option in the future, the subordinates can only influence other subordinates' behavior and respond to this by following through on their commitment to challenge.
In sc the rate at which beneficiaries challenge and the rate at which it is successful significantly depends on whether it is the pre-committed or free subordinate who is targeted by the leader's divideand-conquer strategy. Our second hypothesis states that a free subordinate will not challenge transgression since she cannot impact either the leaders' or subordinates' future behavior. Lacking the strategic incentive to challenge, the hypothesis is that the rates of beneficiary and coordinated resistance will be lower in lc than in b. Notice in Table 1 that when the committed subordinate is targeted -and the free subordinate is the beneficiary -the rate of beneficiary challenging drops to a megar 18.4%, which is marginally significantly lower than in the baseline (p = 0.1047). Result 2. The rate of beneficiaries challenging given both indicate an intention to challenge is marginally lower in sc when the target of the leader's transgression is the committed subordinate.
On the other hand, when the free subordinate is targeted by the leader, the rate of pre-committed beneficiaries challenging rises to 63.4%, significantly higher than the overall rate in b (p = 0.0000).
This is an extremely high rate of subordinates whose action matches the intended action. The rate of coordinated resistance is also higher: 63.4% versus 24.6% (p = 0.0000). One potential explanation is psychological in nature -these subjects follow through at a much higher rate in an effort to avoid cognitive dissonance. Subordinates who are pre-committed to all of their actions select their intended actions for all possible decisions by the leader and conditional on the intended choice of the free subordinate, and then immediately record their actual action for each possible message from the other. As a result, they may be more likely to follow through on what they said was their intended action to avoid saying one thing and then doing another. Another potential explanation for high beneficiary resistance among committed subordinates is that they gambled on the free subordinates being willing to reciprocate. Because the committed subordinates are not able to observe whether free subordinates were engaging in beneficiary resistance, they may pay the relatively small cost to engage in it themselves in the hope that doing so will sustain mutual cooperation.
Result 3. When the target of the leader's transgression is the free subordinate, the rate at which pre-committed beneficiaries challenge -given both indicate an intention to challenge -is significantly higher than the rate of beneficiary challenge in b.
Resistance Given Any Signal
This section looks at the frequency of beneficiary resistance and coordinated resistance when the leader attempts to divide-and-conquer, irrespective of the signals sent by the beneficiary and victim. This broader measure is harder to interpret since a number of circumstances are treated the same. For example, it treats the case of a beneficiary who does not challenge after the victim indicates an intent to acquiesce the same as a beneficiary who does not challenge after the victim indicates intent to challenge. Nonetheless it captures some features of the data that the measure used in the previous section does not. These are cases where successful joint resistance would be less likely to occur, so it is interesting to see how such a factor impacts the rate at which beneficiaries resist. Table 3 reports the frequencies for each treatment. Not surprisingly, the frequencies are lower than when both indicate challenge, but show a similar a pattern. Comparing within treatment, in b, the frequency of beneficiary challenging under any signal is lower than when both indicate an intention to challenge -12.7% versus 27.1% (p = 0.0000); it is also lower in lc -15.2% versus 44.1% (p = 0.0000); and lower in sc when the free subordinate is targeted -27.2% versus 63.4%(p = 0.0000). The only case where the two rates are not statistically different is in sc when the committed subordinate is targeted -13.8% versus 18.4%(p = 0.2650). Interestingly, this provides evidence that the messages sent do not alter the beneficiary resistance behavior of the free subordinate; that is some cheap talk! Table 3 : Resistance Rates Given Any Signal (p = 0.0000). All of these results also hold for the rates of joint resistance. As a result, using this less restrictive measure for resistance rates, we find no evidence in favor of the expectation-building hypotheses.
Result 4. The rate of beneficiary and joint resistance given any signal in b are not significantly different from the rates in lc or in sc.
Overall, then, the results are not supportive of the expectation-building hypothesis. We introduced the hypothesis that the high rate of beneficiaries challenging -and high rate of coordinated joint resistance -observed in the DAC game could be due to strategic decision-making by the subordinates. Thus our results provide support for the hypothesis that beneficiaries who challenge a leader's transgression are exhibiting solidarity with the victim.
Conclusions
The divide-and-conquer game provides a fruitful framework in which to explore a range of motivations for the observed solidarity among subordinates. In our experiment, subjects repeatedly play the DAC game under random and anonymous re-matching and with different types of pre-commitment. We investigate the extent to which the observed coordinated joint resistance -which is not predicted by game theoretic analysis of the game -can be explained by several potential motivations. One potential explanation appeals to norms for fairness: when facing a leader attempting to divide-and-conquer, the who would benefit by choosing to acquiesce, instead chooses to challenge due to fairness considerations. Another explanation appeals to reputation-building behavior: there is an individual incentive for building a group reputation in an effort to achieve more efficient outcomes in the future.
Overall our results provide additional support for the hypothesis that beneficiaries who challenge are exhibiting solidarity with the victim, rather than attempting to strategically expectation build.
A Instructions for Phase 1
There are two types of decision-making experiments: psychology and economics. In psychology experiments, sometimes the researchers deceive participants involved in the study. When this happens, they are required, before the end of the experiment, to debrief everyone about the nature of the deception.
Deception is not permitted in an economics experiment. This is an economics experiment.
Please read the following instructions carefully. If you have a question at any time please raise your hand and an experimenter will come by to answer your question.
Instructions for Phase 1
This is an experiment in the economics of multi-person strategic decision-making. If you follow the instructions and make appropriate decisions, you can earn an appreciable amount of money. The currency used in the experiment is points. Your points will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of $0.09 dollars to one point. At the end of todays session, you will be paid in private and in cash. It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other peoples work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. There will be two phases to the experiment: Phase 1 and Phase 2. Phase 1 will consist of 10 periods. The 18 participants in todays experiment will be randomly split each period between three equal-sized groups, designated as Person 1, Person 2 and Person 3 groups. If you are designated as a Person 1, then you remain in this same role throughout both phases of the experiment. Participants who are not designated as a Person 1 switch randomly between the Person 2 and Person 3 roles in different decision-making periods throughout both phases of the experiment. Phase 2 will be a similar decision-making task, and you will have the same role in it that you have in Phase 1. Further instructions will be provided before Phase 2 begins. At the beginning of each decision-making period you will be randomly re-grouped with two other participants to form a three-person group, with one person of each type in each group. The groupings change every period, since you will be randomly re-grouped in each and every period. to make the same actual choice corresponding to their intended choice, and they are always free to select either choice X or Y when they make their actual decision.
The End of the Period After everyone has made choices for the current period you will be automatically switched to the outcome screen, as shown below. This screen displays your choice as well as the choices of the people you are grouped with for the current decision making period. It also shows your earnings for this period and your earnings for the experiment so far.
Once the outcome screen is displayed you should record your choice and the choice of the others in your group on your Personal Record Sheet. Also record your current and cumulative earnings. Then click on the OK button on the lower right of your screen. Remember, at the start of the next period all participants are randomly re-grouped, and you are randomly re-grouped each and every period of the experiment. We will now pass out a questionnaire to make sure that all participants understand how to read the earnings tables and understand other important features of these instructions. Please fill it out now. Raise your hand when you are finished and we will collect it. If there are any mistakes on any questionnaire, I will summarize the relevant part of the instructions again. Do not put your name on the questionnaire.
B Instructions for Phase 2: Baseline
We are entering the second and final phase of the experiment. This phase will last for 40 periods.
Each of these 40 periods is identical to those in Phase 1.
Please continue to record all decisions on the Personal Record Sheet for your role; they are attached to Phase 2 instructions.
C Instructions for Phase 2: Leader Commitment
The only difference between periods in this phase and periods in the previous phase is that each Person 1 will choose all of their actions for the next 40 periods now, before any more periods are played.
That means in the next 40 periods, each Person 1 will be pre-committed to actions that they will specify for each period after they finish reading this screen.
Those in the roles of Person 2 and Person 3 will make choices identically to how they did in Phase 1. Persons 2 and 3 will now have a few minute wait while those in the role of Person 1 make their next 40 choices.
D Instructions for Phase 2: Both Commitment
There are two important differences between periods in this phase and periods inthe previous phase:
1. All Persons 1 will choose all of their actions for the next 40 periods now, before any more periods are played.
That means in the next 40 periods, each Person 1 will be pre-committed to actions that they will specify for each period after they finish reading this. That means in the next 40 periods, half of the Persons 2 and 3 will be pre-committed to intended choices and actions that they will choose before any more periods occur.
The other half of the Persons 2 and Person 3 will make their choices in each period as in Phase 1.
Note: for earnings square D, all Persons 2 and 3 will be restricted to intended choice "X" and action "X".
The division of the Persons 2 and 3 into these two categories will remain constant across all 40 periods of this phase.
All participants will continue to be randomly re-grouped in each and every period.
Additionally, in each and every period, each Person 1 will be grouped with one Person 2 or 3 who is pre-committed, i.e. has already indicated an intended choice and chosen an action for the period without observing any choices by others, and one Person 2 or 3 who is not pre-committed, i.e.
indicates his/her intended choice and action for each period as in Phase 1.
